📰 Volltext Iran's Provocations Trump Blink
📝 Zusammenfassung
Zvi Bar'el analysiert Irans 'low-intensity deterrence'-Strategie: Teheran setzt auf kalkulierte Vergeltungsschläge gegen Golfstaaten, um Trump unter Druck zu setzen. Kuwait wurde trotz Neutralität getroffen. Die Golfstaaten fordern Schutz, aber auch Zurückhaltung – ein strategischer Widerspruch. Diese Unsicherheit spielt Iran in die Hände: Jeder Tag ohne Abkommen erhöht den Preis. Solange Trump keine klare Antwort findet, bleibt die Region in der Eskalationsspirale.
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📰 Volltext (Haaretz) – Zvi Bar'el, 4. Juni 2026
Israel and the Gulf states are trapped inside a tit-for-tat strategy that Iran is using against U.S. President Donald Trump, one that resembles the one Hezbollah employed against Israel for years. That was in evidence on Wednesday when Iran attacked Kuwait's airport and launched missiles at Bahrain after U.S. forces attacked targets on Iran's Qeshm Island in the Gulf.
At the beginning of the war, Iran justified its attacks on the Gulf states by claiming they served as launch pads for U.S. attacks against it, thereby making them legitimate targets.
But on Wednesday, a statement issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps offered a purely retaliatory justification: "The attack is a response to the blatant U.S. aggression against Iranian sovereignty on Qeshm Island. Any new folly, aggression or action that harms even one inch of our borders and sovereignty will be met with a seismic, crushing and decisive response that will exceed established rules. Our forces will not hesitate to target all aggressors."
This is not "legitimate self-defense" in a war of existence, but a tactical response to a U.S. attack, as part of Tehran's policy of non-containment.
Kuwait is still maintaining full diplomatic relations with Iran, despite getting attacked by hundreds of missiles and drones at the start of the war (not much less than the amount of attacks on the United Arab Emirates). In response to the attack on its airport on Wednesday, Kuwait merely expelled two Iranian embassy employees.
The other Gulf states issued strong condemnations, but the United States still doesn't view these almost daily exchanges as "breaking the cease-fire." Trump claims (but Iran denies) that negotiations have been ongoing through messages exchanged between Washington and mediators, primarily Pakistan.
For now, the U.S. and Iran are trying to keep tactical responses proportionate, a tactic called "low-intensity deterrence." Examples include the limited number of missiles or drones launched and their chosen targeting and avoidance of collateral damage to vital infrastructure targets, such as desalination plants.
The goal is to prevent a "miscalculation" that escalates into an all-out war. Iran's modus operandi is not only to "exact a price" for every U.S. action and demonstrate resolve and "steadfastness" to principles, but also to set a "tariff" on the time that passes without a political solution.
Kuwait's situation is different from that of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. It hosts some small U.S. bases providing aircraft refueling and maintenance services for the U.S. Central Command and has even allowed its territory to be used for launching attacks on Iran. However, Kuwait is not identified as a part of the "Israeli axis" like Abu Dhabi, nor is it a close American ally like Saudi Arabia. And although it has been designated a "major non-NATO ally," like Qatar and the UAE, since 2004, it has sought to stay neutral vis-à-vis Iran and the other Gulf states.
It appears that the limited attack on Kuwait was based on Iran's belief that it would not cause the U.S. to escalate to the point of scuttling a diplomatic solution.
At the same time, the attack on Kuwait sends a worrying message to the other Gulf states, even if they weren't the targets this time.
The pummeling suffered by each Gulf state shattered the widely held assumption that Iran would never stage a direct attack on its neighbors. Today, mapping where Tehran strikes may indicate its intentions and readiness to push the envelope short of all-out war.
The Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman, continue to pursue a policy of containment, pressuring the U.S. to pursue diplomacy. They were also among the countries that influenced Trump's order to Israel to limit its attacks in Lebanon as Iran had demanded, due to its risk to the diplomatic back-and-forth.
Herein lies the strategic contradiction: while the Gulf states expect Washington to protect them from Iranian attacks, they are calling for restraint at the same time, merely condemning Iran's attacks on their allies. Their leaders might be quite pleased about the ugly confrontation between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Monday and that Netanyahu's influence in White House decision-making has been significantly reduced. But they can't be certain that Netanyahu's declining influence with Trump will be replaced with their own.
The way Trump has dictated Israel's rules of engagement with Hezbollah is for them a two-dimensional test case. On the one hand, Iran looks like the "winning side" because it bent the president's arm. On the other hand, Arab states also seem successful, since they have been able to pressure Trump to curb Israeli attacks and host talks between Israel and Lebanon.
However, even if this can be seen as an Arab achievement, it stemmed from Tehran's insistence that the Gulf and Lebanon are connected areas of conflict and that escalation in Lebanon would freeze U.S.-Iran negotiations and heighten the risk of a wider conflict erupting in the Gulf. For this reason, the Gulf states have found it challenging to formulate a mutually agreed-upon policy about Iran should Tehran expand its attacks rather than limiting itself to measured targets like the attack on Kuwait.
Such uncertainty plays into Iran's hands, because its attacks set a price for the failure to reach an agreement, while raising the risk of a "miscalculation" as a component in its strategic considerations. Because such a factor is not under Trump's control, Iranian leaders believe it will leave him no choice but to offer further concessions soon. If Trump doesn't, he runs the risk that growing Iranian attacks would compel the Gulf states to respond, jeopardizing his chances of reaching the agreement he wants with Iran.
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